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How do religions and nationalism interact in secular democracies? With its history of 
nationalism based on religious ideologies, and the subsequent forced separation of state and 
religion, Japan provides a valuable case to examine how religion and nationalism interact and 
affect the politics of a secular state. The purpose of this dissertation is to understand and 
synthesize the divide within the literature regarding the idea that Shinto is fundamentally 
nationalist in nature. Due to Shinto’s historical ties to Japanese nationalism, it is clear that 
religion and nationalism played a role in Japanese politics in the past. However, with Japan’s 
transition to democracy and the constitutional provision of the separation between religion and 
state, religion’s effect on nationalism in Japan has become blurred contemporarily. In order to 
explore these relationships between Shinto, nationalism, and Japanese politics, I investigate how 
political groups and religious organizations influence nationalist sentiment in political 
institutions and public opinion in Japan using the Japanese Value Orientations survey and an 
original dataset. I find that even though the evidence is mounting against the accuracy around the 
idea of State Shinto and the fundamentally nationalist nature of Shinto, the narrative persists. The 
existence of nationalist circles perpetuates these narratives, regardless of the truthfulness of the 
association between Shinto and nationalism because this narrative serves as a benefit to some 
groups. Shinto may not be automatically nationalist, but there are still nationalistic Shinto 
practitioners. The description of Shinto as inherently nationalist is not likely to go away while 
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1.1 Considering Shinto and Nationalism 
How do religions and nationalism interact in secular democracies? It is easy to imagine 
that characteristics that a nation sees as unique to its state, such as religion, ethnicity, or cultural 
elements, could be used as justifications to enact nativist policies. However, in secular 
democracies, while groups with nationalist ideologies are obviously going to exist, there is an 
assumption that democratic institutions can help address the divisions in a society and mediate any 
potential conflicts, whether those divisions are caused by ethnic tensions (Lijphart 2004), religious 
differences (Fox 2007), or other divisive elements. Yet, with the rise in nationalist sentiment 
around the globe, and its growing influence (i.e., Brexit, Build the Wall), it is apparent that secular 
democracies can also be affected by nationalism in diverse ways. 
In order to protect against the potential tyranny of the (religious) majority, it is assumed 
that liberal democracies will enact a separation of state and religion (Fox 2007). Nevertheless, 
what this separation looks like can be widely variant, as the rules and enforcement of those rules 
are not uniform across secular democracies. As a result, the interaction between religion and 
nationalism in secular democracies can also have varying effects. Due to its history of nationalism 
based on religious ideologies, and the subsequent forced separation of state and religion, Japan 
provides a valuable case to examine how religion and nationalism interact and affect the politics 
of a secular state. In order to demonstrate this relationship, I investigate how political groups and 
religious organizations influence nationalist sentiment in political institutions and public opinion 
in Japan.  
Shinto is often considered the indigenous religion of Japan, but the discussion surrounding 
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Shinto is complicated and often debated. Whether it is truly indigenous or an adapted form of 
Daoism from China, Shinto became intertwined with Japanese Buddhism to the point that the 
distinctions were unclear and shrines and temples became indistinguishable (Hardacre 2017). The 
Meiji government (1868-1912) officially separated Shinto and Buddhism and created what came 
to be known as “State Shinto”, arguing that Buddhism was a foreign import, and that Japan needed 
an inherently Japanese national ideology.  
Japan’s history with State Shinto during the pre-war era has left a lasting impact on how 
Japan considers the role of religion in politics. Perhaps as an effort to appear in compliance with 
western norms of modernity, the Japanese government declared that State Shinto was a moral code 
and not a religion. The emperor of Japan also utilized State Shinto as a means of mobilizing a 
nationalist movement. Even after World War II ended, Shinto retained its status as a moral code. 
Due to the fact that many scholars and Shinto priests alike consider Shinto to not be a religion, but 
a way of life, the impact of Shinto on Japanese politics contemporarily is not well understood.  
After World War II, however, State Shinto was disestablished under the supervision of the 
United States with the writing of Japan’s constitution. Further, while Shinto, separate from State 
Shinto, was allowed to still be practiced, all state funding was taken away from Shinto shrines (Pye 
2003). In other words, under State Shinto, the Japanese government and Shintoist beliefs and 
values were paired in order to reinforce the government’s legitimate right to rule. By appealing to 
the beliefs of Shinto, the emperor reinstated his divine right to rule and placed State Shinto under 
the jurisdiction of the state. By dismantling State Shinto but still allowing Shinto to be practiced 
by Japanese citizens, the United States separated Shinto from the authority of the government, but 
still allowed it to be practiced in the capacity of a decentralized religion. 
However, while State Shinto was removed, the belief in the non-religious nature of Shinto 
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in general remained. Shinto priests and scholars alike have made the argument that Shinto does 
not fit the concept of being a religion (Josephson 2012). The logic of Shinto being a moral code 
rather than a religion that was presented during the Meiji Restoration persisted after World War 
II, with supporters of the argument that Shinto is not a religion stating that Shinto is more political 
or organizational than religious. Separating Shinto from its religious status was also an attempt to 
separate the practice of Shinto from State Shinto in an effort to signal that adherence to Shintoist 
beliefs and values were not meant to be an attempt at revitalizing a nationalist movement that 
desired to violently take over other countries, but simply a way to act in accordance with the nature 
of what it means for a person to be Japanese. 
Contemporarily, it is certainly the case that Japan is a secular nation, as over half of 
Japanese citizens (57%) stated they were not affiliated with any religions as of 2015 (Pew Research 
Center 2016).  Further, with Japanese laws upholding freedoms for its citizens regarding the right 
to religion, and rules that limit the ties between religion and politics in Japan, there are clear 
separations between religion and the state. However, although the relationship between religion 
and politics is well demonstrated throughout Japan’s history when analyzing contemporary 
Japanese politics, religious influences are rarely examined. Because of the history surrounding the 
separation of state and religion implemented by United States occupiers after World War II, the 
extant literature often treats Japan and Japanese politics as being areligious (Josephson 2012; 
Azegami 2012).  
However, the assumption that Shinto is not a religion, or at the very least that Shinto does 
not follow religious characteristics, needs to be challenged. As of 2015, 70.4% of people in Japan 
engaged in Shintoist practices even if they did not declare themselves to be affiliated with Shinto 
(CIA World Factbook). By not considering the role that Shinto might play on Japanese politics, 
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this could be a significant oversight considering the number of people who identify as being a 
member of this group. In his book chapter, “What is Religion?”, Smith (2017) argues that the 
reality of religion is more important than the concepts of religion. Smith states: 
Religion is a complex of culturally prescribed practices, based on premises about the 
existence and nature of superhuman powers, whether personal or impersonal, which seek 
to help practitioners gain access to and communicate or align themselves with these 
powers, in hopes of realizing human goods and avoiding things bad. (Smith 2017, 22) 
 
Instead of a set of beliefs, Smith defines religion as a network of practices, such as interventionist, 
behavior-regulating, and discursive practices. Further, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
different methods of studying religion. While a person’s beliefs or sense of belonging to a religious 
group are important indicators of how religion can affect one’s political attitudes and participation, 
so too is a person’s religious behaviors.1 By examining Shinto through this lens, Shinto can be 
justified as being studied as religion, even with its political history.  
A consequence of previous scholarship considering Shinto as nonreligious is that the 
influence of religion on Japanese politics has been underexamined. Scholars have shown great 
interest in how Shinto helped shape Japan’s past, but the discussion of how religion and politics 
interact in present-day Japan is limited, although growing. Japan’s constitution and laws that were 
instituted after World War II were not free from the influence of religion and religious groups, 
even though the American occupiers abolished the state’s version of Shinto. Jinja Honcho (the 
Association of Shinto Shrines) has also been especially active in trying to maintain the prominence 
of Shinto’s image in Japan, hoping to influence Japanese laws, such as restoring state support of 
Yasukuni shrine and encouraging political visits to the shrine (Hardacre 2017). As a result of not 
studying these ties, the influence of religion on Japanese citizens’ political preferences and voting 
 
1 See Hackett and Lindsay 2008 for an example of how different measures of religion can produce varying results. 
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behaviors is not clear. However, because institutional structures that were established after the war 
were influenced by religious groups, it is still valuable to explore the contemporary relationship 
between religion and Japanese politics, even if Japan is considered to be a highly secular state.  
Historically, Shinto has been associated with nationalist ideologies in Japan, not only 
because of the events surrounding World War II, but also because of the Shintoist beliefs in the 
divinity of the emperor and the desire of Jinja Honcho for Shinto to be interpreted as part of 
Japanese national character (Azegami 2012; Josephson 2012). More recently, however, this 
assumption that Shinto is inherently nationalistic is increasingly challenged (Hardacre 2017; 
Thomas 2019). By exploring the connections between Shinto religious practices, political 
preferences, and nationalism in Japan, Chapter 2 of this dissertation aims to contribute to a more 
general understanding of how religious and political preferences are connected in Japan by testing 
these two competing arguments empirically. The Japanese Value Orientations Survey, which has 
been conducted every five years in Japan since 1973, consistently asks a variety of questions 
regarding the opinions of people in Japan about political, religious, and sociological topics. Using 
this survey, I discuss how the average Shinto practitioner does not automatically have nationalist 
political ideologies and is therefore not a useful predictor for nationalist sentiment or support for 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Instead, the chapter finds that LDP support and nationalist 
sentiment are more directly related. 
1.2 Different Types of Shinto Practitioners 
Based on the findings of Chapter 2 that Shinto practitioners are not innately nationalist, 
Chapter 3 explores why the association between Shinto and nationalism persists in the behaviors 
of political and religious groups in present-day Japan. Do Shintoists and non-Shintoists participate 
in politics differently from one another? For that matter, do Shinto nationalists have different 
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political behaviors than Shinto non-nationalists? Using the Japanese Value Orientations survey, 
Chapter 3 finds that a distinction can be made between Shinto nationalists and non-nationalists 
and how they participate in politics. This distinction allows for a richer discussion of how 
Shintoists participate in politics, not only compared to non-Shintoists, but also to one another. 
According to the results of Chapter 3, Shintoists were more likely to participate in various 
forms of politics than non-Shintoists, and Shinto nationalists were more variant than Shinto non-
nationalists in types of political participation. It seems that both Shinto nationalists and Shinto 
non-nationalists have a desire to be heard in various forms of political participation. This finding 
could influence modern Japanese politics by helping to explain why nationalist interest groups and 
political officials continue to associate Shinto with nationalism, as Shinto nationalists could serve 
as an outspoken and effective base. Thus, the use of Shinto iconography and the association with 
nationalist history continues to be a useful narrative, despite its foundations in misinformation. 
1.3 Using Religious Affiliation as a Political Advantage 
It is certainly not uncommon for democracies to have political parties that are based on 
ethnic or religious ties. Due to religion’s influence on a person’s set of values and beliefs, it is 
logical that a political party based on religious ideologies would form in order to represent the 
interests of that religion’s followers. However, the interpretation of separation of religion and state 
varies between secular nations. While the religious affiliation of political parties is not seen as 
problematic in some states, such as the Christian Democratic Union in Germany, this is not the 
case in all secular states. In Japan, the Komeito political party is largely supported by the Buddhist 
sect, Soka Gakkai (McLaughlin 2014). The Komeito party was criticized, however, for being 
unconstitutional based on the language regarding the separation of religion and the state. Komeito 
eventually officially separated with Soka Gakka to assure their critics that they were a secular party 
7 
and were not giving Soka Gakkai advantages (Abe and Endo 2014). Yet, the formal breaking of 
ties can seem unconvincing, given that Soka Gakkai is still the largest voting bloc for Komeito. 
Similarly, considering Japan’s political history, it seems unlikely that Shinto would have 
no political influence contemporarily. While there is no Shintoist political party, Jinja Honcho 
does oversee a political organization called Shinto Seiji Renmei. Due to the LDP’s history of 
friendliness toward nationalist ideologies, it is reasonable that members of the LDP would be 
attracted to the policies promoted by Shinto Seiji Renmei. Currently, the majority of Liberal 
Democratic Party members in Japan’s lower house are also members of the Shinto Seiji Renmei. 
However, this was not the case in 2012 when the LDP regained their position as Japan’s ruling 
party, which means that LDP membership in Shinto Seiji Renmei must be motivated by something 
other than ideology alone.  
What are the motivations for joining such a group, considering Japan has institutional 
regulations regarding the separation of politics and religion, in addition to there being no sign of 
rising religiosity among the Japanese population? Chapter 4 of this dissertation explores these 
motivations. By focusing on politicians’ electoral incentives in a changing environment of Japan’s 
party politics, we can see how the existence of the distinction between Shinto nationalists and non-
nationalists found in chapter three can affect Japanese politics. This chapter makes apparent that 
there are benefits to be gained by religious and political organizations when they reinforce the 
narrative that Shinto is fundamentally nationalist. As the opposition became fragmented after 
2012, the ruling party’s candidates found it electorally advantageous to signal to the core 
supporters rather than the centrist floating voters by joining Shinto Seiji Renmei. An empirical 
analysis of an original dataset supports this argument. The findings suggest the changes in Japan’s 
political landscape might affect the future strategies of LDP politicians, particularly regarding the 
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coalition with Komeito. Overall, this chapter proposes that there is a need to pay closer attention 




IS SHINTO A NATIONALIST RELIGION? EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
SHINTO, NATIONALIST SENTIMENT, AND SUPPORT FOR THE LDP 
2.1 Introduction 
It is reasonable to assume that religion would be influential in forming the ideologies and 
values reflected in a society’s general public opinion (Norris and Inglehart 2011). Thus, religious 
beliefs are an important consideration when studying public opinion and political affiliation, even 
in a secular democracy. Based on Japan’s history of militant nationalism during World War II and 
its connection with State Shinto, the association of religious symbols with Japanese politics can 
create mixed reactions from the Japanese public. One of the most commonly discussed instances 
of religious symbolism in Japanese politics is when political officials make visits to Yasukuni 
shrine.2  On the other hand, when considering how religion and religious affiliation might affect 
public opinion and political affiliation in Japan, the relationship is unclear. As for Japanese 
citizens, 70.4% of people stated they participated in Shintoist practices and 69.8% observed 
Buddhist practices in 2015 (CIA World Factbook). However, when asked which religion they 
belong to, 57% of people said they were unaffiliated with any religion (Pew Research Center).  
Does Shinto predict support for nationalist policies and practices, or is there a desire for 
those who believe in Shintoist values to separate themselves from the association between Shinto 
and a Japanese national identity? Is the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) trying to appeal to a 
religious base, or are they only utilizing Shintoist symbolism and iconography in order to relate 
their party with a sense of national identity by drawing on associations of the (constructed) past 
 
2 Yasukuni is a Shinto shrine that houses those who have died serving is a war for Japan, so long as their war death 
can be verified. The controversy surrounding this shrine is discussed below. 
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relationship between Shinto and the Japanese nationalist state? 
This chapter questions the assumptions behind the idea that Shinto is a nationalist religion. 
The literature regarding this assumption is divided. With the creation of loaded terms, such as 
“State Shinto”, some argue Shinto, nationalism, and the state of Japan are naturally tied together 
(Josephson 2012; Azegami 2012). Because of Shinto’s historical ties with nationalism, it would 
seem plausible to assume people who engage in Shintoist practices would be more likely to adopt 
nationalist ideologies and politically support the LDP. Further Shintoist beliefs in the divinity of 
the emperor and the idea that Shinto is part of Japanese national character lend support to this 
argument.  However, particularly more recently, other scholars are pointing to evidence that 
Shinto’s inherent nationalist tendency is a false narrative based on misunderstandings and 
oversimplifications of this history (Hardacre 2017; Thomas 2019). Thus, it is also possible the 
average Shintoist practitioners have a wide array of political views that are not associated with 
Shinto’s past.  
Using the Japanese Value Orientations Survey, I aim to contribute to this discussion by 
empirically testing the ties between practicing Shinto, nationalist sentiment, and support for the 
Liberal Democratic Party. I find practicing Shinto is a poor indicator for predicting if a person has 
strong feelings of nationalist sentiment or is a supporter of the LDP. Instead, the more 
straightforward relationship is between strong nationalist ideology and LDP support, suggesting 
political groups use Shintoist iconography to motivate or signal nationalist sentiment, rather than 
Shinto practitioners being naturally inclined toward or against nationalist ideologies. 
2.2 Shinto, Nationalism, and the LDP 
There is a historical association between Shinto and nationalism born out of the Meiji Era 
(1868-1912) and what came to be known as State Shinto. Ideals attached to Shinto 
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fundamentalism, such as belief in the divinity of the emperor, desires of ethnic purity, and the 
aspiration for Shinto to represent a distinct sense of Japanese character, provided the government 
with effective tools to motivate a nationalist movement (Skya 2009). The Meiji government 
decided to make a distinction between private (religious) Shrine Shinto and public (civil) State 
Shinto (Zhong 2016). Because of this history, the extant literature often treats Japanese politics 
and Shinto as being areligious (Josephson 2012; Azegami 2012).  
Consequently, Shinto is frequently described as a civil ideology with nationalist 
underpinnings. After World War II, State Shinto was disestablished under the supervision of the 
United States with the writing of Japan’s constitution. Emperor Hirohito also made a declaration 
that he did not come from a divine lineage, and the imperial government became a constitutional 
monarchy. Further, while Shrine Shinto, separate from State Shinto, was allowed to still be 
practiced, all state funding was taken away from Shinto shrines (Pye 2003). 
More recently, this historical association between Shinto and nationalism has become 
increasingly challenged. Although these events did occur, such as the attempt to separate Shinto 
into a private and public sphere and attempting to use Shinto as a moral code, several scholars 
argue our understanding and interpretation of these events are flawed. For instance, the distinction 
of what Shinto meant was a fairly new concept, as it was only divorced from Buddhism during the 
Meiji era (Hardacre 2017). Further, Buddhist priests also participated in Japan’s effort to 
modernize and militarize its government during the expansion in World War II, so placing the 
attention on Shinto undermines the role played by other religious groups (Rambelli 2011; Victoria 
2011). Another perspective is that pairing Shinto and nationalism implies blame for repression and 
militarism should be placed on Shinto as a state religion, rather than on the secularist government 
(Thomas 2019). Rather, the association of Shinto and nationalism exists because of the desires and 
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efforts of Shintoist and nationalist groups, such as Jinja Honcho3 and Nippon Kaigi.4 
However, as groups such as Jinja Honcho and Nippon Kaigi demonstrate, even though the 
origins of the association between Shinto and nationalism may not be as straightforward as saying 
Shinto is inherently nationalist, the consequences of this narrative are very much real (Guthmann 
2017). Often framed as the Liberal Democratic Party’s lingering appeal to Japanese nationalism, 
it is hard to argue the political controversies surrounding Yasukuni shrine visits do not have 
religious undertones since Yasukuni is a Shinto shrine, even though it does not fall under the 
umbrella of Jinja Honcho (Breen 2011). As Yasukuni shrine is dedicated to all verifiable Japanese 
war dead, this includes honoring Japanese war criminals who have died. Thus, political visits to 
Yasukuni have an inherent risk of both international and domestic criticism.  
Figure 2.1 graphs the descriptive statistics for the national level election results (in 
percentages) for the Liberal Democratic Party for the 2000-2012 general elections, as well as the 
public approval ratings of visits to Yasukuni shrine for each of these years (Asahi Shimbun 2017; 
Pollmann 2016). The percentage of Japanese citizens who believe in Shintoist values according to 
the Agency for Cultural Affairs are also included for these five elections. It is worth noting the 
percentage of Shinto adherents, according to the Agency for Cultural Affairs, is very high, staying 
above 75% for this period of twelve years. Looking at Figure 2.1, the percentage of Shinto 
adherents stays relatively constant, despite the varying support for the LDP and Yasukuni visits. 
This figure suggests those who identify with Shinto are not necessarily connected to the same 
people who support the politically motivated visits to Yasukuni. Further, members of the Liberal 
 
3 The Association of Shinto Shrines, which oversees around 80,000 Shinto shrines and advocates for nationalist 
policies (Shibuichi 2017; Tawara 2017). 
4 The Japan Conference, a nationalist lobbying group that can trace its origins back to Shinto organizations (Mizohata 
2016). 
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Democratic Party might be utilizing Shintoist symbolism and iconography in order to relate their 
party with a sense of national identity by drawing on associations of the past relationship between 
Shinto and the Japanese state. 
Figure 2.1: Comparison of % Shinto, Support for LDP, and Yasukuni Visits 
 
 
In the subsequent analysis, I empirically evaluate the following hypothesis on which 
competing expectations exist:  
H1: Shinto practitioners will be more likely to express nationalist sentiment.  
 
Since some teachings of Shinto share ideologies with Japanese nationalist groups, like the 
belief in the divinity of the emperor, it is possible that practicing Shinto would be good predictor 
for increased nationalist sentiment. However, if Shinto’s association with nationalism is false, as 
Thomas (2019) and Hardacre (2017) argue, there could be an inconclusive or even negative 
relationship between Shinto and nationalism. 
At the same time, the effects of the narrative that Shinto is associated with nationalism 
could have an influence on party support preference: 
14 
H2: Shinto practitioners will be more likely to support the LDP.  
 
Due to the Liberal Democratic Party’s history of supporting nationalist policies, Shinto 
practitioner would likely support the LDP if Shinto is inherently nationalistic. Yet, as with the first 
hypothesis, if Shinto practitioners do not support nationalist policies or wish to separate themselves 
from this association, they may be less likely to support the LDP. 
Perhaps the more accurate association is more direct: a relationship between support for 
the LDP and nationalist sentiment: 
H3: Those who express nationalist sentiment are more likely to support the LDP than those 
who do not. 
 
Consequently, nationalist appeals by the LDP using Shinto iconography are better 
understood as a signal to a specific subset of Shinto followers and nationalists in general. As 
Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1983) argue, nationalism is created by the state in order to produce 
a sense of cohesion within society. Thus, while nationalist groups may draw upon ideas of Shinto 
to conjure nationalist sentiment, those with nationalist political leanings are not necessarily the 
same people who practice Shinto. Instead, it is these nationalist groups that reinforce these 
associations between political and religious elements, such as the shared memberships between 
Nippon Kaigi, Jinja Honcho, and the Liberal Democratic Party. 
2.3 Data and Methods 
This chapter draws from the Japanese Value Orientations Survey, which is conducted every 
five years in Japan since 1973.5 The survey consistently asks a variety of questions regarding the 
opinions of people in Japan about political, religious, and sociological topics. The unit of analysis 
 
5 The data for this secondary analysis, " The Survey on Japanese Value Orientations, 1973-2013, Public Opinion 
Research Division, NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute," was provided by the Social Science Japan Data 
Archive, Center for Social Research and Data Archives, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
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is at the individual level.  
2.3.1 Dependent Variables 
For the first hypothesis, I test whether people who practice Shinto are associated with 
nationalist sentiment. The nationalist sentiment dependent variable is an indexed variable based 
on the response to three survey options: 1) Japanese people are superior to others:6 2) Japan is a 
first-tier country:7 3) There are many things to learn from other countries.8 The first two responses 
are coded as 1 if the respondent agreed with the statement and a 0 if they disagreed. Conversely, 
the third response is assigned a value of 1 if the respondent believed that Japan had nothing to 
learn from other countries and a 0 if they indicated that there are many things to learn from other 
countries.9 These answers were then combined to create a nationalist sentiment index, with a 
minimum score of 0 (least nationalist) and a maximum score of 3 (highly nationalist).10 This 
hypothesis will help determine if religious participation has an impact on the likelihood of a person 
expressing nationalist sentiment.  
The second hypothesis tests if those who have nationalist ideology are more likely to 
support the LDP; thus, the dependent variable for this hypothesis is support for the LDP. If the 
respondent indicated their support for the LDP, they are coded as a 1.11  Otherwise, a 0 indicates 
the choice for all other parties. The dependent variable for the third hypothesis is also based on 
 
6 ナショナリズム：日本人は、他の国民に比べて、きわめてすぐれた素質をもっている 
7 ナショナリズム：日本は一流国だ   
8 ナショナリズム：外国から見習うべきことが多い 
9 The correlation between the three variables is fairly minimal, with a score of 0.29 for the first-tier and superior 
country questions, 0.08 for the first-tier and nothing to learn questions, and 0.06 for the nothing to learn and Japan as 
superior country questions. 
10 The resulting index has a mean of 1.34 with a standard deviation of 0.91. 
11 See Appendix A for a list of all parties. 
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this question regarding a person’s support for a particular party. Specifically, this hypothesis is 
interested in the effects of religious participation on support for the Liberal Democratic Party.  
2.3.2 Independent Variables 
The Value Orientations Survey does not include questions that specifically ask if the 
respondent is a practitioner of Shinto. Thus, this chapter uses two related questions to create an 
indexed variable to try to relay the concept as closely as possible. The variables chosen primarily 
signify religious behaviors rather than beliefs. First is the question that indicates if the respondent 
practices religious things, with a 1 indicating practice and a 0 for not practicing.12 I have coded 
those who also responded that they believe in Buddha as a 0 to increase the probability that the 
religious practices refer to Shinto. Further, because the population of Christians in Japan is less 
than 2%, the probability that these religious practices are associated with Christianity should be 
very low (CIA World Factbook). Thus, any inclusion of Christians in this variable should not have 
a notable impact on the variable. 
The second religious variable in the index has a clearer association with Shinto. The 
respondents are asked if they own/believe in charms such as ofuda (fortunes) and omamori 
(talismans) that ward against evil, with a 1 signifying yes and 0 no.13 Although omamori and ofuda 
are greatly associated with Shinto, Buddhist temples can also distribute them. Thus, the 
respondents who stated their belief in Buddha were coded as a 0 for this question, as well.14 These 
two religious variables are combined to create an index from 0 to 2, with a 0 signifying no religious 
 
12 宗教的行動：ふだんから宗教的な行いをしている 
13 宗教的行動：魔よけや縁起物を身の回りにおいている       
14 The correlation between these two variables is very minimal, at 0.04. 
17 
participation and a 2 being the maximum level of participation in Shinto.15 This index is used for 
hypothesis 1 that tests the relationship between religious practice and nationalist sentiment, as well 
as for hypothesis 2 that examines if Shintoist religious practices can serve as a predictor of support 
for the Liberal Democratic Party.  
For the third hypothesis, the nationalist sentiment index – which tallies the respondent’s 
answers to the Japanese superiority, Japan as a first-tier country, and Japan has nothing to learn 
questions – is used as the independent variable. This hypothesis postulates that the more likely 
predictor for respondents who support the LDP is their level of nationalist sentiment, meaning as 
the level of nationalist sentiment increases, the likelihood that the respondent supports the LDP 
also increases.  
2.3.3 Control Variables 
Control variables commonly associated with having an influence on nationalist sentiment 
or a person’s support of the Liberal Democratic Party include sex, age, education level, and city 
size. The variable for sex is binary, with a 0 indicating the respondent answered male and a 1 
meaning female. Age is an ordinal variable with five-year age ranges from 16-74, and then 75 and 
over. The variable for level of education reflects the respondent has more than a high school 
education if the value is 1 and a 0 for high school or less. Finally, city size is divided into urban 
and rural, with urban meaning the city has a population of 300,000 people or more and rural being 
less than 300,000. An ordered logistic regression is used for the first hypothesis because of the 
nationalist sentiment index. A logistic regression model is used for hypotheses two and three due 
to the binary nature of the dependent variables. 
 
15 The mean for this variable is 0.19 and has a standard deviation of 0.42. 
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2.4 Results 
2.4.1 The Impact of Practicing Shinto on Nationalist Sentiment 
Overall, Table 2.1 indicates participating in religious activities has an inconclusive to a 
negative relationship with feelings of nationalist sentiment. Thus, the analysis does not provide 
support for the argument that those who practice Shinto are more likely to hold inherently 
nationalist ideologies. The relationship was only significant in the years 1993, 1998, and 2008, but 
in these years Shinto practitioners were less likely to identify with the nationalist statements. 
Instead, the strongest personal indicator of holding increased nationalist sentiment is age, meaning 
the older a person was, the more likely they were to have increased nationalist ideologies. Although 
not always significant, the control variables for education, and city size do fall into the expected 
direction when they are significant. However, women were more likely to have stronger nationalist 
sentiment than men when the variable was significant. In short, those who are female, less 
educated, and live in rural areas are more likely to have an increased nationalist sentiment 
throughout the years than their counterparts. 
2.4.2 The Impact of Practicing Shinto on Support for the LDP 
Similar to Shinto’s common association with nationalism, a connection is also often made 
between Shinto and the Liberal Democratic Party. Most notably, visits to Yasukuni shrine by LDP 
politicians, including former Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe, have garnered domestic and 
international attention. However, when considering the relationship between Shinto religious 
practice and support for the LDP, those who are Shinto practitioners have an inconclusive 
relationship with those who support the LDP except for in the year 2003 (see Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.1: Impact of Practicing Shinto on Feelings of Nationalist Sentiment 













































































































































N 3,297 3,232 3,306 3,122 3,116 2,956 2,707 2,519 2,543 
𝑋𝑋2  228.54*** 227.11*** 247.53*** 201.90*** 200.90*** 348.62*** 232.70*** 167.36*** 139.67*** 
Standard Errors in Parentheses *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
Table 2.2: Impact of Practicing Shinto and Feelings of Nationalist Sentiment on Support for LDP 
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N 3,297 3,232 3,306 3,112 3,116 2,956 2,707 2,519 2,543 
𝑿𝑿𝟐𝟐  229.93*** 327.60*** 385.56*** 338.89*** 277.25*** 370.10*** 312.33*** 156.89*** 204.27*** 





In fact, the impact for that year is negative, meaning those who practice Shinto were less 
likely to support the LDP in 2003. As with hypothesis 1, these results suggest that, at most, being 
a Shinto practitioner is negatively correlated with being a supporter of the LDP, if there is a 
relationship at all. Taken together the idea that Shinto is inherently nationalistic and that those who 
practice Shinto are more likely to support nationalist policies is unsupported. 
2.4.3 The Impact of Nationalist Sentiment on Support for the LDP 
If practitioners of Shinto are not the driving predictors for nationalist sentiment or support 
for the LDP, where does the connection actually lie? Table 2.2 also illustrates that a respondent 
with increased nationalist sentiment is positively correlated with that respondent supporting the 
Liberal Democratic Party. This correlation is statistically significant at the 0.001 level for all years 
available within the survey data.  
As with hypothesis and Table 2.1, age is again a strong predictor. The model finds those 
who are older are more likely to support the LDP. This is the case in all years in the survey. 
Although they are not significant indicators for all years, sex and city size have a fairly consistent 
relationship with supporting the LDP, with men and people in rural areas being more likely to 
indicate their support for the LDP. Education is not a strong indicator for these hypotheses, as there 
is only a significant relationship between education level and support for the LDP in the year 1993. 
However, it is still in the expected direction that the respondent is more likely to support the LDP 
if they have a lower level of education. It may be worth noting that 1993 was one of two years 
where the Liberal Democratic Party lost power. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Considering the findings of the three hypotheses together, these results suggest those who 
are practitioners of Shinto should not be automatically assumed as supporters of the LDP or 
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nationalist ideals. Instead, the relationship between nationalist sentiment and support for the 
Liberal Democratic Party exists on its own. Although nationalist groups such as Nippon Kaigi 
arguably have Shintoist ties and although the Liberal Democratic Party’s use of Yasukuni shrine 
is arguably a nationalist gesture, we cannot argue Shinto and its followers are the foundation of 
nationalism. 
As discussed above, this is not to say that Shinto practitioners are never supporters for the 
LDP or that Shinto practitioners never adhere to strong nationalist ideologies. It is worth noting 
that the only conclusive findings (years 1993, 1998, and 2008) suggest a negative relationship 
between Shinto and nationalism. At the same time, however, the majority of the time, there are no 
conclusions we can draw one way or another about this relationship. Rather, the reality is more 
nuanced than some coverage of historical events indicated. What is perhaps happening, then, is 
that there are possibly different groupings of Shinto practitioners. This is a logical conclusion, as 
there are different sects of Shinto, like what can be found in Japanese Buddhism.  
This distinction that there are different types of Shinto practitioners would be important 
when thinking of why the LDP and nationalist groups use Shinto and its iconography, as they are 
likely trying to communicate with a subset of Shinto practitioners. Despite the misinformation 
surrounding the start of the association between Shinto and nationalism, that is a narrative that has 




THE SQUEAKY WHEEL GETS THE GREASE: COMPARING THE POLITICAL 
BEHAVIORS OF SHINTO NATIONALISTS, SHINTO  
NON-NATIONALISTS, AND NON-SHINTOISTS 
3.1 Introduction 
There is a debate within the scholarly literature regarding the inherently nationalist nature 
of Shinto. While older literature tends to assume that Shinto and nationalism are intrinsically 
connected, more recent scholarship has demonstrated that these historical connections are likely 
more complicated. What does this mean when considering the political participation of Shinto 
practitioners compared to those who are not adherents to Shinto? I argue that Shinto practitioners 
will be more likely to participate in a multitude of political avenues than non-Shintoists. Further, 
the divide within the literature also points to the possibility that there are different categories of 
Shinto practitioners regarding nationalist sentiment. This chapter divides Shinto practitioners into 
Shinto nationalists and Shinto practitioners who do not have strong nationalist sentiment (hereafter 
categorized as Shinto non-nationalists). By adding this distinction, I find that there is not only a 
difference in political participation between Shintoists and non-Shintoists, but also between Shinto 
nationalists and Shinto non-nationalists. While Shintoists as a whole are more likely to participate 
in politics than non-Shintoists, Shinto nationalists also participate in politics in more ways than 
Shinto non-nationalists. This finding helps contribute to our understanding of how the historical 
context of the relationship between Shinto and nationalism affects current political behaviors. 
The influence that religion can have on political participation gives valuable insights to the 
discussions of political behavior and democratic consolidation. For instance, in an American 
context, churches and religious organizations can help train its religious adherents in various forms 
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of civic engagement and political participation, thus having the capacity to strengthen democratic 
processes and values (Djupe and Gilbert 2006; Jamal 2005; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). 
However, there is also the concern that religion’s ties to traditionalist values could be detrimental 
to democracy, particularly when religion is paired with nationalist sentiment (Davis 2018; Davis 
and Perry 2020; Whitehead et al. 2018). This chapter first examines this literature regarding the 
relationship between religion and political participation in a general sense, and then explores this 
topic in the context of Japan. I argue that Shintoists are more likely to participate in multiple 
political forms than non-Shintoists. Further, I also expect to find that Shinto nationalists will be 
more likely to participate in various political mediums than Shinto non-nationalists. Using the 
Japanese Value Orientations survey, I find support for these hypotheses. Finally, I discuss the 
potential consequences of these findings, namely that it could be in the interest of nationalist 
groups and political officials to play into the association between Shinto and nationalism, as Shinto 
nationalists could serve as a vocal and politically active base. 
3.2 Religion and Political Participation 
When talking about religion and political participation, we often hear about how religious 
affiliation affects partisan voting and vote choice in general in an American context (Calfano and 
Djupe 2009; Campbell et al. 2011; Green 2007; Green 2009; Holman and Shockley 2017; Layman 
1997). Some articles help clarify definitions or show how other factors, such as ethnicity, create 
different or interactive effects (Connaughton 2004; Kelly and Kelly 2005). Others challenge norms 
and expectations, notably the religious Republican and atheist Democrat assumption (Claassen 
2015), or switching the focus from Christian denominations (Ayers and Hofstetter 2008; Brockway 
2018; Schoettmer 2013).  
The literature has also expanded to include different types of political participation other 
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than voting, such as protesting or writing their Congressperson (Arikan and Bloom 2019; Djupe 
and Neilheisel 2012). Religious affiliation also gets a deeper look, as the authors start considering 
factors such as church attendance and membership in church groups. For instance, religious 
affiliation on its own might be more likely to reduce political participation, but when paired with 
church attendance, groups, and activities, political participation tends to increase (Driskell et al. 
2008). This could be due to church groups helping citizens develop necessary civic skills that allow 
for more informed political participation (Djupe and Gilbert 2006; Jamal 2005; Jones-Correa and 
Leal 2001). This literature has greatly contributed to our understanding of how religion can have 
an impact on political participation, and in turn affect politics.  
Often, the discussion of the relationship between religion and politics examines the impact 
this relationship might have on democracy and democratic consolidation. Churches can play a role 
as socializers for the political structure (Huckle and Silva 2020). However, this role can go either 
way. Some research finds that churches can increase democratic ties by informing and training 
their congregation with democratic values (Audette and Weaver 2016; Djupe and Calfano 2012). 
Conversely, other scholars argue that churches can weaken these democratic ties due to preference 
of traditional values (Robinson 2010; Wilcox 2011).  
Christian nationalism in particular has become a point of focus. Christian nationalists in 
the United States assert that the US has a “distinctively Christian heritage and future”, and these 
values influence political choices, behaviors, and ideologies (Whitehead et al. 2018, 147). For 
instance, the concern that democratic values will take a backseat to traditional values also appears 
in the discussion of Christian nationalism. As nationalism in general is concerned with who 
belongs to the in-groups and out-groups, Christian nationalism helps define those terms. Further, 
authoritarian attitudes and control measures can be encouraged due to intolerance toward the 
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outgroup (Davis 2018). Prejudicial attitudes toward not just ethnic and racial minorities, but 
marginalized groups in general, are commonly found among Christian nationalists (Davis and 
Perry 2020).  One recent example of the relationship between Christian nationalism and politics 
comes from the Christian nationalist beliefs in distrust of science and scientific experts (Baker et 
a. 2020). This ideology impacted the downplaying or disregarding the seriousness of the COVID-
19 pandemic, which contributed to the politicization of the pandemic (Perry et al. 2020). 
In the context of Japan, the literature on religion and political participation is not yet as 
vast as it is for the United States. Typically, discussions regarding the relationship between religion 
and political participation, are in reference to Soka Gakkai and Komeito. A Buddhist sect based 
on the teachings of Nichiren, Soka Gakkai is a religious group that founded the Komeito party in 
1964 (Ehrhardt et al. 2014). Although the Komeito Party eventually officially cut ties with Soka 
Gakkai in order to prevent legal issues due to the constitutional separation of religion and state in 
Japan, there is still an assumption that Komeito draws most of its base from Soka Gakkai (Abe 
and Endo 2014). However, closer evaluation finds that social identity is not enough to persuade 
Soka Gakkai members to vote for the Komeito party, and thus the party must react to the demands 
of individuals in the religious group by making appeals regarding policy claims in order to win 
their vote (Ehrhardt 2009). Further, as is commonly found in the literature in an American context, 
being part of Soka Gakkai as a religious organization can provide opportunities for developing 
political skills (Ehrhardt 2014). While this literature on the connections between Soka Gakka, 
Komeito, and political participation is incredibly valuable and insightful, it does not even cover 
Buddhists in general, but a specific sub-set.  
When analyzing Shinto and its relationship with political participation, there are additional 
complications. Due to the process and designations that Shinto experienced during the Meiji Era, 
27 
Shinto is often not even treated as a religion, despite having components like the belief in spirits 
and the deification of the emperor (Josephson 2012). This is perhaps due to the fact that it was 
more valuable for Shinto to be seen at this time as a Japanese moral code and a tool of the state 
(Breen and Teeuwen 2010).  
Other complications are created from this time period, as well. The extent to which Shinto 
is inherently nationalist is debated in the academic literature. With the implementation of the 
“Shinto Directive” by the United States during its occupation of Japan after World War II, it was 
clear that the American government considered “State Shinto” to be directly associated with the 
Japanese government’s militaristic and ultranationalist approach (Okazaki 2010). This directive 
forced a separation of Shinto and the Japanese government, prohibiting the use of public funding 
for Shinto shrines, as well as other forms of state support for Shinto practices (Breen and Teeuewen 
2010). “Shrine Shinto”, private adherence to Shinto ideals and rituals, was permitted to exist, 
however.   
Like the United States government after the war, there are also scholars who argue that 
there are nationalist underpinnings to Shinto (see for example Fukase-Indergaard and Indergaard 
2008; Holtom 1947; Kumada 2018; Guthmann 2017). With tenets such as the deification of the 
Japanese Emperor, it is clear to see how the Japanese government during the Meiji government 
would want to be paired with Shinto. Further, current nationalist groups in Japan, such as Jinja 
Honcho (the Association of Shinto Shrines) and Nippon Kaigi (the Japan Conference), use 
foundations in Shinto to justify some nationalist ideologies (Burchardt et al. 2015; Mizohata 2016; 
Shibuichi 2017; Tawara 2017). Conversely, there are also those who contend that the history 
between Shinto and nationalism is more complicated, and that Shinto is not necessarily 
nationalistically inclined (Fridell 1976; Hardacre 2017; Thomas 2019). Instead, Shinto was used 
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as a tool of the government to amplify nationalist ideologies, but this does not mean that Shinto 
was inherently nationalistic. For instance, it was not only Shinto but also Buddhist priests who 
promoted the superiority of the Japanese government and supported the war effort (Rambelli 2011; 
Victoria 2011). Yet, Buddhism in Japan is not discussed as being inherently nationalistic. 
3.3 Shinto and Political Participation 
This chapter argues that both of these perspectives are true to an extent. The idea that 
Shinto’s history is more complex than simply being defined as nationalistic or not nationalistic is 
a growing discussion with rich, new insights. The evidence that Shinto was used as a tool of the 
state, and thus should not automatically assume nationalistic ideologies is convincing. However, 
the narrative that Shinto is a nationalist religion has not only endured, but it has also been 
strengthened by scholars, Japanese nationalist groups, and political officials. This distinction of a 
not entirely true, but still reinforced, history of a nationalist Shinto means there will be 
consequences on the relationship Shinto, and political behavior.  
I expect that the reason it is possible for Shinto to not be inherently nationalist and yet also 
possible for political nationalist groups to depend on Shinto iconography to send nationalistic 
messages is because there are two groups of Shintoists. Further, they might participate in politics 
differently, not only from one another, but from non-Shintoists. Thus, anticipate that Shintoists 
will consequently be more motivated to participate in politics than non-Shintoists because there 
are competing voices within Shinto that are trying to be heard.  
H1: In a comparison of individuals, those who are Shintoists are more likely to participate 
in multiple forms of politics than non-Shintoists. 
 
Additionally, the persistence of the modern connection between Shinto and nationalism 
may be due to the political behaviors of Shinto nationalists.  It could be the case that Shinto 
nationalists will be more consistently involved in visible forms of political participation, other than 
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voting, and thus are a reliable and consistent core to which politicians and nationalist groups can 
signal. Consequently, this may be why we still see evidence in modern politics of a connection 
between Shinto and nationalism, such visits to Yasukuni shrine and the growing relevance of Jinja 
Honcho and Nippon Kaigi. This relationship could also work in the inverse direction. If Shinto 
nationalists are more politically engaged than their Shinto non-nationalist counterparts, they would 
be able to advocate for themselves, and thus politicians and interest groups could be more likely 
to rely on Shinto nationalism since Shinto nationalists are already sharing their interests and 
demands in a variety of political forms.  
H2: In a comparison of individuals, those who are Shinto nationalists are more likely to 
participate in various forms of politics than Shinto non-nationalists. 
 
3.4 Research Design 
This chapter tests the above hypotheses using the Japanese Value Orientations (JVO) 
survey.16 The JVO survey has been conducted every five years since 1973, and the current version 
includes respondent answers up through 2013. Based on the survey data, the unit of analysis for 
this chapter is individual respondents. The dependent variables are types of political participation, 
including participating in demonstrations,17 signing petitions,18 writing the media,19 making 
political donations,20 attending political meetings,21 and being an acting member of a political 
 
16 The data for this secondary analysis, "The Survey on Japanese Value Orientations, 1973-2013, Public Opinion 
Research Division, NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute," was provided by the Social Science Japan Data 
Archive, Center for Social Research and Data Archives, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
17 政治活動：デモに参加した                                   
18 政治活動：署名運動に協力した                                       
19 政治活動：マスコミに投書した    
20 政治活動：献金・カンパした                                 
21 政治活動：集会や会合に出席した                         
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organization or party.22 Each type of political participation is a dummy variable, with a 0 indicating 
that the respondent has not participated and a 1 signifying that the respondent has engaged in that 
type of political participation. 
There are two independent variables used to test the hypotheses: Shinto nationalists and 
Shinto non-nationalists. For both independent variables, a score of 0 denotes the reference category 
of non-Shinto practitioners. Since the Japanese Value Orientations survey does not specifically 
ask the respondent to which religion they belong, being a Shinto practitioner is based on two 
questions regarding the respondent’s religious behaviors. First is the question that asks if the 
respondent practices religious things.23 In order to make sure that this question captures Shinto 
practitioners and to eliminate the possibility that the respondent practices Buddhism, those who 
indicated that they believe in Buddha were not included. Additionally, Christian responses would 
also not have a significant impact on this variable, as the number of Christians in Japan is less than 
2% (CIA World Factbook). The second question that indicates if the respondent is a Shinto 
practitioner asks if the person owns/believes in charms and talismans that are commonly associated 
with Shinto.24 Since Buddhist temples can also sell and distribute these items, those who indicated 
that they believe in Buddha were likewise not included for this question. Given these parameters, 
if the respondent answered affirmatively to either of these questions, they are coded as a Shinto 
practitioner. 
Whether a respondent is nationalist is based on a nationalism index that was created using 







Japan is a first-tier country:26 3) Japanese people are superior to others.27 In order to be considered 
a nationalist, the respondent needed to indicate their agreement with at least two of these 
nationalism survey options. This coding decision was made to better capture a stronger sense of 
nationalist sentiment, rather than simply general pride in one’s country. 
The first independent variable, Shinto nationalist, is coded as a 1 if the respondent is both 
a Shinto practitioner and a nationalist based on the above criteria. The Japanese Value Orientations 
survey contains responses from 33,328 individuals. Among them, 2,055 individuals qualify as 
Shinto nationalists, meaning they comprise about 6% of the observations. The second independent 
variable, Shinto non-nationalist, is indicated by a 1 if the respondent is a Shinto practitioner but 
does not meet the criteria for being considered a nationalist. There are 3,185 respondents, about 
10% of the observations, who fall into this category. Consistent with other surveys and polls, non-
Shintoists make up the vast majority of the respondents, at about 85%, or 28,088 individuals, and 
they are the reference category in the analysis below. 
The control variables available in the JVO survey that could also have an impact on a 
person’s political behavior are sex, age, education, and city size. The sex, education, and city size 
variables are all binary variables. For sex, a 0 signifies male and 1 female. Education takes a value 
of 0 if the respondent has a high school education or less and a 1 if they have gone beyond high 
school. The area the respondent lives is considered urban if it has 300,000 people or more and is 
coded as a 1. A population of less than 300,000 is considered rural and coded as a 0. Age is 
separated into categories with five-year ranges from 16-74, and then 75 and over. Finally, a binary 
variable is included for each year that the survey was conducted. Based on the binary nature of the 
 
26 ナショナリズム：日本は一流国だ   
27 ナショナリズム：日本人は、他の国民に比べて、きわめてすぐれた素質をもっている 
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dependent variables, a logistic regression is used to test the hypotheses. 
3.5 Results 
Across the board, Shinto practitioners as a whole tend to participate in various forms of 
politics than non-Shintoists. As Table 3.1 illustrates, Shinto non-nationalists are more likely to 
sign petitions, donate, and write to the media than non-Shintoists.28 There is no statistical evidence 
that Shinto non-nationalists are different from non-Shintoists for attending demonstrations, 
attending political meetings, and being members of political groups. As for Shinto nationalists, 
there are likewise no categories of political participation where non-Shintoists outperformed them.  





























































































N 32,907 32,907 32,907 32,907 32,907 32,907 
𝐗𝐗𝟐𝟐  507.10*** 711.12*** 44.99*** 433.10*** 1282.26*** 333.29*** 
Standard Errors in Parentheses *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
 
28 For readability, the dummy variables for each year were not included in Table 3.1. They can be found in Appendix 
B.  
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Shinto nationalists are more likely to attend demonstrations, sign petitions, give donations, attend 
political meetings and be members of political groups than non-Shintoists. Only writing to the 
media had inconclusive results. These findings lend strong support to the first hypothesis that 
Shinto nationalists and non-nationalists are more likely to participate in a variety of political 
mediums than non-Shintoists. 




Between Shinto nationalists and non-nationalists, the two groups are no more or less likely 
to participate in these various forms of politics than the other, with one important exception. Shinto 
nationalists are more likely to be members of political groups than Shinto non-nationalists. As 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates, this likelihood is much more apparent and significant. Although Shinto 
practitioners are overall more likely to participate in politics in a variety of ways, there is only a 
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political organization or group. Thus, findings only lend partial support to the second hypothesis 
that Shinto nationalists are more likely to participate in various forms of politics than Shinto non-
nationalists, although both categories of Shinto practitioners actively participate in a variety of 
political forms. 
While the findings regarding the control variables are important, they are not necessarily 
surprising. For each form of political participation, men were significantly more likely than women 
to be involved. Age was also a consistently influential factor, with demonstrations being the only 
inconclusive result. 
Older age categories were more likely to sign petitions, write the media, donate, attend 
political meetings, and be members of political groups than younger age groups. Those who were 
more educated had statistically significant results with participating in demonstrations, signing 
petitions, writing the media, donating, and attending political meetings. Respondents from rural 
areas were more likely to sign petitions, attend political meetings, and be members of political 
groups, while those from urban areas were more likely to make political donations. 
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter finds support for the idea that Shinto nationalists and Shinto non-nationalists 
are more likely to participate in multiple forms of politics than non-Shintoists. This finding 
contributes to the debate regarding the inherently nationalist nature of Shinto and supports the first 
hypothesis that Shintoists will be more likely to participate in politics in a variety of ways. While 
there is strong evidence that the idea of Shinto being fundamentally nationalistic is based on 
historical inaccuracies and oversimplification of the history around the Meiji Era, the impression 
that Shinto and nationalism are connected has still endured to modern Japanese politics. This 
seeming conundrum has created an interesting reality: Shinto practitioners are not a homogenous 
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group regarding nationalist ideology. Both Shinto nationalists and Shinto non-nationalists make 
an effort to participate in a variety of political mediums, perhaps in an effort to be heard over the 
other group. Thus, Shintoists in both groups are more likely to participate in various forms of 
politics than non-Shintoists. 
While Shinto non-nationalists are more likely to be involved in some forms of political 
participation than non-Shintoists, they are either matched in participation with the Shinto 
nationalists, or they are even outdone by the Shinto nationalists. Thus, there is also a distinct 
difference between Shinto nationalists and Shinto non-nationalists. Although not all Shintoists are 
nationalists, those who are nationalist are more likely to participate in one more visible form of 
politics than Shinto non-nationalists: being members of political parties and organizations. By 
being active in additional forms of politics than Shinto-non-nationalists, those who belong to the 
Shinto nationalist group are able to express their desires and wishes in more forms than the Shinto 
non-nationalists. Additionally, this might also mean that politicians are more likely to use Shinto 
as a nationalist signal even though Shinto is not inherently nationalist. Overall, Shinto nationalists 
as a group are debatably more politically active in a form that is likely to have greater influence in 
party politics, and therefore they can serve as a reliable core for nationalist interest groups and 




THE POLITICAL STRATEGY OF APPEALING TO RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM: 
EXAMINING MOTIVATIONS TO JOIN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS  
BY JAPANESE LDP POLITICIANS29 
4.1 Introduction 
Media outlets and scholarly works are inundated with discussions of the influence and 
repercussions of nationalism and nationalistic policies around the world. With events such as 
former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s pledge to revise Japan’s Constitution to formalize the role of 
the Self-Defense Force, Japan’s trade wars with South Korea, and the increase of books and articles 
in recent years focusing on the influence of the nationalist lobbying group Nippon Kaigi, also 
known as the Japan Conference, concerns regarding an increasingly nationalist Japan are on the 
rise. Influenced by the memory of a government created, nationalist version of State Shinto,30 the 
religion of Shinto is perceived to at least have nationalistic inclinations, if not being fully 
nationalistic (Azegami 2012). This perception is often supported by occurrences such as political 
visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which causes both national and international controversy due to the fact 
that Yasukuni enshrines Japan’s war dead, including Class-A war criminals (Breen 2008; Pye 
2003; Ryu 2007). Thus, official political visits are associated with an endorsement for State Shinto 
and Japan’s aggressive, militaristic past. Additionally, politicians holding memberships in both 
 
29 This chapter is reproduced from Gentry, Hope Dewell, 2020, “The Political Strategy of Appealing to Religious 
Nationalism: Examining Motivations to Join Religious Organizations by Japanese LDP Politicians,” Politics and 
Religion 1-21, with permission from Cambridge University Press. 
30 I would like to acknowledge here that there is a disagreement within the literature regarding the pervasiveness of 
State Shinto, and even its religious nature and true affiliation with Shinto. However, it is outside the scope of this 
chapter to answer these questions. What is most pertinent to this chapter is the collective memory regarding State 
Shinto and the association between Shinto and nationalism that has grown as a result of this collective memory. If the 
reader is interested in further exploring the divergence within the literature, I recommend the following books and 
articles: Hardacre 2011; Hardacre 2017; Rots and Teeuwen 2017 and the full “Formations of the Secular in Japan” 
special issue from Japan Review; Thomas 2019. 
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Nippon Kaigi and Jinja Honcho, the Association of Shinto Shrines, further cement the association 
between far-right, nationalist ideologies and Shinto. For example, as of 2018, 18 out of the 19 
Ministers in Abe’s Fifth Cabinet were members of Nippon Kaigi or Jinja Honcho’s political 
organization, Shinto Seiji Renmei.31 
With the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) tendencies toward nationalist policies, 
including the Abe Cabinet’s extremely high rate of membership in nationalist groups with Shintoist 
affiliations, it is logical to assume that members of the LDP would commonly be associated with 
Shintoist groups, such as Jinja Honcho and their affiliated political group, Shinto Seiji Renmei 
(Shinseiren). Further, Shinseiren commonly endorses the LDP but not other parties, as Shinseiren’s 
positions on nationalist policies such as restricting non-Japanese from being able to vote are most 
closely aligned with the LDP (Klein and Reed 2014). However, the number of Shinseiren members 
among the LDP Lower House experienced an increase from 51% in 2013 to about 75% in 2014.  
Since the number of people in Japan who are affiliated with any religion has only been shrinking 
over time, this increase in Shinseiren membership cannot be explained by a turn toward religion. 
Further, as members of the LDP were largely not associated with Shinseiren in 2012, the escalation 
of memberships would also not be prompted by general ideological similarities, either.32 So, if not 
for religious or ideological reasons, why was there a sudden surge in Shinseiren membership by 
politicians within the LDP after the 2012 general election? 
While nationalism in Japan is commonly associated with Shinto due to their shared history, 
this chapter finds that identifying with or belonging to a religious organization can be done for 
 
31 Known in English as the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership. Asia Policy Point. 2018. The Point. November 
4. Accessed November 6, 2019. http://newasiapolicypoint.blogspot.com/2018/11/the-ministers-of-abes-fifth-
cabinet.html. 
32 The data source used to determine this trend is explained later. 
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politically strategic reasons, in this case, to guarantee more votes in order to ensure reelection. 
Religion and religious organizations certainly have an influence on politics in Japan, but the 
motivations for religious memberships are not necessarily driven by ideological reasons. Instead, 
I argue that membership into the religious organization, Shinseiren, is motivated by strategic 
reasons, as the LDP legislators now had electoral incentives to join Shinseiren after the 2012 
general election. In Table 4.1, the number of Shinseiren members in the Japanese National Diet 
are outlined by year, with a few LDP-leaning independents, but almost all being LDP politicians. 
Between 2013 and 2014, the number of Shinseiren members in the Diet increased by 87 members. 
While individual changes in ideology cannot be ruled out, it does not seem likely that the 
noteworthy increase in Shinseiren memberships between these two years would only be due to 
ideological reasons. Considering the Japanese general election had just occurred in 2012, the 
timing of the increase in memberships could be due to political motivations.  
Table 4.1: Number of Shinto Seiji Renmei Members in the Japanese National Diet by Year 





September 2013 204 149 55 
August 2014 291 213 78 
July 2015 302 222 80 
July 2016 297 223 74 
July 2017 310 228 82 
July 2018 294 211 83 
 
Before the 2012 general election, Japan’s party politics largely functioned as a two-party 
competition, with the LDP and its main opponent, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) competing 
for the centrist voters. However, with the DPJ’s drastic decline in popularity after its stint as the 
ruling party following the 2009 election, the LDP no longer has a viable competitor, changing the 
LDP candidates’ incentive strategies. The LDP experienced a strong return to power in the 2012 
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general election, with many legislators being rookie Diet members. With virtually no external 
competition, the electoral incentive changes for the individual freshman LDP legislators to 
focusing on core LDP voters instead of centrist voters. Thus, if individual members of the LDP 
won by a smaller vote margin during the 2012 general election, joining Shinseiren could serve as 
a signal to core supporters, appealing to a specific bloc of voters and increasing their chances of 
reelection.  
To explain how members of the LDP use Shinto and its connection to nationalism 
strategically, this chapter first discusses how connections between Shinto and Japanese 
nationalism have been made in the past, and how this legacy, despite its questionable historical 
accuracy, lives on. Next, the chapter discusses how rookie LDP legislators were incentivized to 
join a religious organization in order to ensure their political survival when their vote margins were 
narrow in the 2012 Japanese general election. The research design describes the original dataset 
created to test the hypothesis that membership in a religious organization is affected by vote 
margins. The analysis finds support for the argument that vote margin affects the likelihood of 
joining Shinseiren. Finally, the chapter concludes by explaining how the results found more 
generally suggest that memberships in religious organizations are not necessarily motivated by 
ideological reasons, and instead can be used in a way that helps achieve political goals. And 
specifically in the case of Japan, these findings might indicate changes in future LDP political 
strategy, such as putting the longstanding coalition with Komeito into question. 
4.2 Nationalism and Religion in Contemporary Japan 
While religion is not a necessary component of nationalistic ideologies, religion is a natural 
pair with nationalism, as it most likely already has a set of guidelines that creates boundaries 
between the in-group and the other. Thus, further rooting oneself into religious traditions can create 
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a sense of comfort and belonging when feeling socially, politically, or economically ostracized 
(Kinnvall 2004). Further, these boundaries can be justified through the nation’s (imagined) 
religious past (Anderson [1983] 2006; Gellner 1983; Juergensmeyer 2019). Although these 
religious “traditions” are actually more modern creations, this does not mean that their influence 
on nationalist ideologies is any less impactful.  
The connection between religion and nationalism in Japan is not as straightforward as it is 
in some other cases around the world. Indeed, the idea of whether Shinto should even be considered 
a religion is still debated.33 Further, there is a disagreement in the literature regarding Shinto’s 
historical connection to nationalism. In his book, Faking Liberties: Religious Freedom in 
American-Occupied Japan, Thomas details how the common narrative that the United States 
brought religious freedom to Japan contains great inaccuracies, and as a result, our understanding 
of a nationalistic Shinto is flawed (2019). Thomas states, “Japanese governance in the first half of 
the twentieth century was repressive because it was secularist, not because it was dominated by 
Shinto� as a state religion” (2019, 3). Authors such as Guthmann, on the other hand, argue that the 
Japanese government tried to characterize Shinto as non-religious in order to appear secular 
(2017). This chapter, however, does not contribute to or make a claim for either side of this 
discussion. Instead, it is the collective memory surrounding this debate that matters to my 
argument (Assmann and Czaplicla 1995). Regardless of the veracity of the claim, scholars and 
historians have long perpetuated the idea that State Shinto is shrouded in a history of religious 
fundamentalism and restrictions to religious freedoms. Whether or not this is true does not lessen 
the impact of the long-term effects this narrative has created between Shinto and nationalism. 
 
33 This chapter takes the position that Shinto should be considered a religion, or at least should studied as having 
religious characteristics. To see more regarding this debate, the reader can refer to the following literature: Azegami 
2012; Guthmann 2017; Hardacre 2017; Josephson 2012; Rots and Teeuwen 2017; Starrs 2011. 
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In order to understand religious nationalism in Japan today, it is necessary to examine the 
ties between various groups and political organizations associated with nationalist ideologies. 
Guthmann refers to these groups of organizations as “nationalist circles” (2017). These nationalist 
circles do not limit their issues to religious ones, and they are not even necessarily religious groups. 
For instance, Nippon Kaigi is a lobby group with nationalist goals. Even Shinseiren is more 
accurately a political organization that is a wing of Jinja Honcho. And while Jinja Honcho is the 
Association of Shinto Shrines, it is largely a bureaucratic organization. Indeed, as with special 
interest groups that appeal on their own behalf to political officials, religious organizations are no 
different. Nippon Kaigi, Shinseiren, and Jinja Honcho at large take an active role in lobbying on 
behalf of their political interests.  
To elucidate on how these nationalist groups fall under the category of religious 
nationalism, Guthmann explains,  
Thus, the majority of the political battles waged by nationalist circles in Japan do not have 
religious dimensions. Yet the fact remains that within these circles, popular devotion for 
the emperor and the existence of a national cult of the war dead at Yasukuni Shrine are 
considered as two fundamental, indispensable elements of a Japan that has regained all its 
state power. The cult of the emperor and the cult of the war dead are two remnants of State 
Shinto, which, I argue…have a religious character (2017, 208-209). 
 
In order to more fully elaborate on how these nationalist circles are tied together, the remainder of 
this section takes a closer look at the issue of Yasukuni shrine, the nationalist ideologies of Nippon 
Kaigi and Jinja Honcho, and how the LDP is connected. 
Perhaps most commonly discussed when considering contemporary religious nationalism 
in Japan is the issue of political visits to Yasukuni shrine, which is dedicated to all verifiable 
Japanese war dead. This includes honoring Japanese war criminals who have died. As a result, 
Japanese politicians who visit the shrine face the possibility of heavy criticism, both from the 
international community and from Japan’s domestic audiences (Deans 2007; Pollmann 2016). This 
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is not to say that Yasukuni is a representation of all Shinto shrines, or even the tenets of Shinto in 
general. However, on the world stage, Yasukini is perhaps the most recognized Shinto shrine.34 
This contributes to the perception of Shinto as a nationalistic religion, regardless of whether or not 
Shinto shrines more generally participate in nationalist practices. 
Visits to Yasukuni shrine are not the only examples of religious nationalism commonly 
discussed in the case of in Japan. Nippon Kaigi, a right-wing organization/lobby group, is a prime 
example of Guthmann’s nationalist circles, as the group advocates for its nationalist ideologies. 
However, its religious connections are not immediately apparent. Coverage regarding Nippon 
Kaigi has spiked only in the last several years despite the fact that the group was established in 
1997 and has played a role in Japanese politics since its inception (Tawara 2017). While it is not a 
Shinto organization, its ideologies are based in religious organizations, one of which being Jinja 
Honcho (Mizohata 2016).35 Like Jinja Honcho, Nippon Kaigi proposes nationalistic policies such 
as revising historical textbooks to downplay or remove discussions of war crimes committed by 
Japan during World War II, and rewriting the Japanese Constitution to allow Japan’s Self-Defense 
Force to officially become a national army that can act offensively as well as defensively (Tawara 
2017). Further, the group also lobbies politicians to support and visit Yasukuni (Shibuichi 2017).  
Jinja Honcho, which oversees approximately 80,000 Shinto shrines, also actively 
campaigns to promote their political interests, such as urging for state support of Yasukuni.36 One 
of the early and notable victories of the organization was in the late 1960s with establishing State 
Foundation Day, a national holiday based on the day that the first emperor, Jinmu, allegedly took 
 
34 Possibly with the exception of Ise shrine. 
35 The other religious organization is Seicho no ie, or House of Birth and Growth (see Mizohata 2016 for more 
information). 
36 However, Yasukuni shrine does not fall under the purview of Jinja Honcho. For more information on Jinja Honcho, 
their website can be found at the following web address: https://www.jinjahoncho.or.jp/ 
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the throne (Hardacre 2017). Much of Jinja Honcho’s lobbying work is performed by Shinseiren 
(Breen and Teeuwen 2010). As with Nippon Kaigi and Jinja Honcho, some of Shinseiren’s 
prominent issues include supporting Yasukuni shrine, reforming the education system, and 
revising the Constitution (Burchardt et al. 2015).37 
One notable member of Nippon Kaigi and Shinseiren is former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. 
Often characterized as a proponent of nationalistic values, Abe is well known for his support of 
constitutional revision that would allow Japan to take a more offensive stance militarily (Pyle 
2018). As the head of the LDP at the time of the 2012 general election, Abe’s values might be 
assumed to represent the ideologies of the LDP. However, the LDP’s platform is not necessarily 
consistent, and there can be wide variation among individual members. This may be partially due 
to the fact that the LDP has been the ruling party in Japan all but two times since it was formed in 
1955, and thus having some more moderate policy proposals helps to keep a larger number of 
voters satisfied (Rosenbluth and Thies 2010).Nevertheless, the LDP is a consistently conservative 
party with nationalist policy tendencies, takes a pro-business approach (Crespo 1995), and has a 
large support base in rural areas (Maeda 2010).  
Under the leadership of Abe Shinzo, the LDP’s ties to far-right policies and its support 
from conservative nationalist voters was apparent. Like the LDP’s former Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro, Abe’s nationalism also demonstrates ties to religious elements, as with his official visits 
to Yasukuni shrine (Fukuoka 2013; Larsson 2017; Mochizuki and Porter 2013). As state support 
of Yasukuni is one of the goals of Nippon Kaigi (Shibuichi 2017), Jinja Honcho (Hardacre 2017), 
and Shinseiren (Burchardt et al. 2015) the similarities of the nationalistic goals and ideologies 
 
37 For more information on Shinseiren, their website can be found at the following web address: 
http://sinseiren.org/index.htm 
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between these groups become evident (Hardacre 2005; Tawara 2017). Further, Jinja Honcho and 
their political organization, Shinseiren, have shown strong support for the LDP’s attempts at 
constitutional revision, even though revision is not inherently a religious issue (Hardacre 2005).  
With these parallel goals and ideologies, it is logical to assume that there would be widely 
shared memberships between these organizations, such as Abe’s membership in Nippon Kaigi and 
Shinseiren. However, only about half (51%) of LDP legislators were members of Shinseiren as of 
September 2013.38 This could perhaps be explained by the fact that shared ideologies do not 
automatically result in shared memberships with organizations that have similar values. With 57% 
of Japanese citizens saying they are unaffiliated with any religion as of 2015, it is possible that 
while members of the LDP support nationalist policies, they do not necessarily affiliate with Shinto 
(Pew Research Center 2016).  
Further, Japan has institutional regulations of the separation between religion and the state. 
Articles 20 and 89 in the Japanese Constitution addresses these regulations, stating:  
Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any 
privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority. No person shall be compelled 
to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice. The State and its organs shall 
refrain from religious education or any other religious activity (Article 20)…No public 
money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or 
maintenance of any religious institution or association, or for any charitable, educational 
or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public authority (Article 89). 
  
Thus, it is reasonable that Japanese politicians would not want to politically affiliate with a 
religious organization for fear of violating the constitutional separation of state and religion, even 
though they are free to associate with any religious group as individuals (Klein and Reed 2014). 
For example, Japan’s Komeito political party was originally founded under the ideologies of the 
Soka Gakkai religious group, which is a sect of Buddhism based on the teachings of Nichiren 
 
38 These data is further explained in the research design. 
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(McLaughlin 2014). Because of this religious affiliation, the Komeito party came under heavy 
criticism by its opposition on both the right and the left as being unconstitutional. Komeito was 
also attacked by the Japanese public as using their influence in politics to give an advantage to 
Soka Gakkai’s goals. As a result, the Komeito party officially cut ties with Soka Gakkai in order 
to assert its secular nature (Abe and Endo 2014). 
Yet, only one year later, in 2014, the number of LDP Lower House members who were 
also part of Shinseiren increased to about 75%. Consequently, fear of being accused of breaking 
constitutional laws does not appear to be a motivator for whether or not politicians join the 
Shinseiren political organization. Further, as the population of Japan is only getting less religious 
over time (Pew Research Center 2016; Reader 2012), the increase in Shinseiren membership 
would also not be due to a growth of religiosity. Thus, the sudden surge of cross-membership 
between the LDP’s Lower House politicians and Shinseiren does not appear to be driven by 
ideological similarities, fear of constitutional violations, or an increase in religiosity. 
In other words, Japan is commonly considered a secular country in the sense that its 
government takes a stance in officially recognizing a separation between religion and the public 
domain of the state.39 While individuals, including politicians, are allowed to privately observe the 
religion of their choosing, the promotion of a particular religion in an official capacity by a public 
figure runs the risk of being unconstitutional, and at the very least could draw criticism from the 
national and international community, such as we have seen with a politician visiting Yasukuni 
Shrine or the suspected pull of Soka Gakkai on the Komeito Party. Further, the Japanese population 
itself is increasingly unaffiliated with any religion, with over half the population stating they do 
 
39 While I am using a more simple definition of the term “secular” for the purposes of this chapter, I would also like 
to acknowledge the complications surrounding this term in the literature. For more information about the nuances of 
this discussion, the reader can refer to articles such as Fox 2007, Hurd 2004, and Hurd 2017. 
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not belong to any religions as of 2015.40 Accordingly, if affiliating with the political organization 
Shinseiren has the potential to damage the Liberal Democratic Party’s ability to win median voters 
from the general voting population, what motivations might the LDP candidates have had in 
joining after the 2012 general election? 
4.3 The LDP and Memberships in Shinseiren 
This chapter argues that politicians make strategic decisions based on individual 
motivations that will benefit their self-interests. Thus, politicians are rational actors that make 
choices in order to stay in power. In this case, individual members of the LDP in the House of 
Representatives made a calculated decision to become members of Shinseiren in order to guarantee 
more votes in future elections.   
The influence of religion on Japanese politics has come increasingly into question as public 
awareness of organizations such as Nippon Kaigi and their connection to powerful political groups 
continues to grow. As mentioned above, almost all of Abe’s Cabinet Ministers are members of 
either Nippon Kaigi or Shinto Seiji Renmei, with a majority being members of both. Because of 
the sudden increase of membership in Shinseiren by the LDP Lower House politicians right after 
the 2012 election, this specific period of time is important to study in order to understand the puzzle 
of the affiliation of LDP politicians with Shinseiren. Decidedly, this timeframe is significant due 
to the unique circumstances of both the LDP’s return to power over its main competitor and the 
high number of junior LDP politicians that joined the Lower House for the first time. This 
particular set of conditions allows us to gain valuable insights on the relationship between religion 
 
40 This chapter references the percentage of the Japanese population that personally affiliates with a particular religion. 
However, the number of Japanese citizens who participate in religious practices, such as holding a Buddhist funeral 
or visiting a Shinto shrine on New Year can differ. The Government of Japan’s Agency for Cultural Affairs has more 
information on these numbers. Further, for a discussion on measuring religion through practice versus belief, please 
see works such as Hacket and Lindsay 2008; Setzer and Burge 2015; and Steensland et al. 2000. 
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and politics in Japan by observing the aftermath of the 2012 general election in the Lower House. 
Before it disbanded, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has long been the LDP’s largest 
opposition party. As such, the LDP and DPJ essentially functioned as two-party system 
competition for much of its history. The DPJ even won the 2009 general election. In the second 
column of Table 4.2, the mean effective number41 of non-LDP candidates by district is calculated 
for each election year, showing that the 2003, 2005, and 2009 elections functioned largely as a 
two-party competition. Due to a variety of factors, the Democratic Party of Japan plummeted in 
popularity after the 2009 election.42 The DPJ only won a total of 57 seats in the 2012 election, 
which was down from 308 seats in 2009. With the Japan Restoration Party winning 54 seats, the 
DPJ’s status as the LDP’s only viable rival completely disappeared. This heavy loss resulted in the 
reinstitution of the LDP as the ruling party in 2012. Table 4.2 showcases the fragmentation of the 
LDP’s opposition after the 2009, which resulted in a major spike in the mean effective number of 
non-LDP candidates and has still not come back down to pre-2012 levels. With the LDP’s most 
notable adversary out of the way, the party itself has no real threat to its power.  
Table 4.2: Unity/Fragmentation of the LDP’s Opposition, 2003-2017 
Election 
Year 
Mean Effective Number of 
Non-LDP Candidates 
Mean Vote Share of the 
Top Non-LDP candidates 
2003 1.57 40.13% 
2005 1.56 39.16% 
2009 1.33 51.16% 
2012 2.45 30.07% 
2014 1.75 34.89% 
2017 1.71 36.24% 
 
 
41 See Laasko and Taagepera 1979 for discussion of the calculation for the effective number of parties.  
42 See Kushida and Lipscy 2013 for an analysis of the DPJ’s time in power after the 2009 election. 
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Under the essential two-party system, most districts experienced a two-candidate 
competition between the LDP and the DPJ candidates. Thus, when the LDP was competing with 
the DPJ for votes, it was in the interest of the LDP politicians to appeal to the centrist voters in 
order to win as many votes away from the Democratic Party of Japan as possible, since winning 
the median voter was the best way to guarantee election (Downs 1957). 
However, since the LDP’s opposition experienced heavy fragmentation in the 2012 general 
election, the LDP candidates no longer have the need to win 50% of the votes. In Table 4.2, the 
third column signifies the average vote share of non-LDP candidates who won the most votes in 
single member districts (SMDs) by election year. Before the 2012 election, the LDP’s biggest 
competitors won more shares of votes, and posed a larger threat to the LDP candidates. However, 
with the drop in the competition’s vote shares in 2012, the LDP candidates, including the rookie 
candidates, did not have the need to seek to win 50% of the votes.  
Instead, in order to ensure their electoral survival, it was in the interest of the individuals 
within the LDP to appeal to their core set of voters in order to guarantee an election. This is 
particularly true for the individual members of the LDP who won by a smaller vote margin, as 
their electoral insecurity makes it more advantageous to appeal to a reliable support base. In this 
case, joining Shinseiren sent a strong signal to a more cohesive set of voters, as voters who are 
concerned with nationalist issues as proposed by these nationalist circles supply a significant base 
for the LDP.  
On the other hand, those LDP politicians who won by a larger margin have no incentive to 
change their behaviors as they are already electorally secure. In fact, an LDP legislator who is 
already secure and becomes a Shinseiren member could even be a dangerous strategy, as it could 
look like the they are changing from their previous political stances. Similarly, another possible 
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cost of an LDP politician joining Shinseiren is creating a potentially negative impact on the LDP’s 
coalition with Komeito. Although Komeito and the LDP may have ideological differences, the 
coalition formed between the two in 1999 has greatly benefitted both parties strategically in 
national elections (Liff and Maeda 2019). By coordinating an agreement where Komeito and the 
LDP decide which of their two parties will run in each SMD, they ensure that their parties are 
never in direct competition with one another. Further, the LDP endorses the candidates from 
Komeito in SMDs where the LDP is not running, and vice versa (Maeda 2010). Because of the 
tensions between the nationalist circle groups and Soka Gakkai and Komeito, it is possible that 
joining Shinseiren could potentially be detrimental for the LDP politician.  
Accordingly, I suggest that an LDP legislator’s SMD vote margins affect the legislator’s 
decision to join Shinseiren. If the vote margin is small, meaning the legislator barely won or lost 
the SMD seat, then the legislator would be more likely to become a member of Shinseiren in order 
to signal to the LDP’s core supporters and guarantee more votes in the next election. In this 
instance, the cost of not joining Shinseiren is greater than the risk incurred by sending a potentially 
negative signal to a voter who supports Komeito.  
I by no means intend to argue that the candidates’ electoral incentives are the only factors 
that determine their affiliation with Shinseiren. For example, it is possible that, like any interest 
group, Shinseiren made direct appeals to the running LDP candidates to become members. 
Religious groups have an advantage politically in that they are able to both organize and mobilize 
others, which as Klein and Reed mention, is “the key to electoral success” (2014, 25). Thus, joining 
a group such as Shinseiren could have great political appeal to LDP politicians, as membership 
could serve as a sort of shorthand to indicate to members of that particular group that the politician 
might represent their interests.  
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To further complicate the matter, however, the scale of influence that Nippon Kaigi and 
Shinseiren have over politics is uncertain, with some sources stating that these groups have 
exceptionally large mobilizing power and financial resources (Aoki 2016), while others argue that 
their political power and financial strength have been exaggerated (Terada 2017). The number of 
LDP candidates who experienced a direct appeal from Shinseiren is unknown. However, whether 
the motivation was due to a direct appeal by Shinseiren or otherwise, I expect a similar result. If 
an LDP political candidate was only interested in appealing to the particular group of core voters, 
then there should be no variation in new memberships. The legislator would be equally advantaged 
whether they had experienced a high or a low vote margin. However, as mentioned above, I argue 
that if they have a larger vote margin, the legislator risks votes they have already won. Yet, if they 
have a smaller vote margin in the 2012 election, the legislator would then have good reason to 
want to signal to a specific group of voters in order to gain a better advantage in the next election. 
Thus, I expect that it is a low vote margin that encourages an increased chance in Shinseiren 
membership, regardless of active appeals from Shinseiren.  
Further, it could also be argued that the LDP legislator’s motivation for joining Shinseiren 
could be a signal to Abe, rather than voters, in order to appeal to his nationalist tendencies in 
exchange for political security. The idea of joining Shinseiren as an appeal to core voters and to 
Abe are not mutually exclusive. Yet, while the intent of signaling to Abe is a possibility, I would 
not expect variation in Shinseiren memberships, as trying to be in Abe’s good graces should be 
appealing to all LDP legislators. Thus, if there is variation in Shinseiren memberships dependent 
on vote margins, this would be a good indication that the LDP legislator’s decision was motivated 
by their desire to appeal to a specific group of voters. 
In summary, I expect that the LDP politicians’ decision to join Shinseiren after the 2012 
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election can be explained by the level of electoral (in)security. Thus, if my argument is accurate, 
the following hypothesis should be empirically supported: 
H: LDP politicians who were elected with a smaller margin were more likely to join 
Shinseiren. 
 
4.4 Research Design 
Because of the surge of Shinseiren memberships by the LDP, this chapter utilizes an 
original dataset that details certain characteristics of individual LDP members in the Lower House 
between the 2012 and 2014 general elections in Japan. My cutoff of the 2014 general election does 
not imply that the effects of vote margins on the likelihood of increased Shinseiren memberships 
would not be relevant beyond 2014. However, major redistricting occurred between 2014 and 
2017, resulting in district boundary changes. As a result, I am unable to equally evaluate vote share 
changes beyond the 2014 general election, as there are not enough observations. 
The unit of analysis is individual Lower House members of the LDP. The LDP won 294 
seats in the 2012 election. Among them, 18 ran only in the PR tier and were elected. These 
legislators were not included in the analysis since they did not compete in any SMDs. Further, 82 
members were excluded as they were already Shinseiren members before the 2012 election, 
leaving 194 observations in the sample.43  The dependent variable takes a value of one if the 
legislator was a Shinseiren member right before the 2014 election, and zero otherwise. The 
Shinseiren’s website (sinseiren.org) shows a list of its members, and using the Internet Archive 
(archive.org), I was able to obtain membership lists at various points in time since 2012.44  
 
43 The data includes both if the candidate was only running in the SMD election and if they ran in both the SMD and 
PR races at the same time. This is due to essentially a lack of variation, as only about 4% of those running did not 
have dual candidacy, and they were mostly senior politicians, including Abe himself. 
44 Only legislator memberships in Shinto Seiji Renmei are used, as memberships in Nippon Kaigi are not publicly 
available. 
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The vote margin serves as the main independent variable, and it reflects the vote share by 
which the politician won or lost the SMD election. As noted earlier, a candidate may lose in an 
SMD but still secure a seat from the PR tier. This variable takes a negative value for those 
politicians, meaning the vote margin can be even smaller than zero. It is expected that this variable 
would take a negative coefficient, as the hypothesis predicts that the legislators who are electorally 
weak will have a higher chance to join Shinseiren. The electoral results data were obtained from 
newspaper websites. 
There are a number of other factors that could influence an LDP legislators’ membership 
in Shinseiren and should be controlled for in the analysis. For instance, common factors that might 
indicate a person’s membership in Shinseiren include being a representative of an older district 
and being a representative of a more rural area (Mudde 2010; Mudde 1996; Golder 2003). Thus, 
age and urbanization are included as control variables. The age variable measures the median age 
of the representative’s district, and the level of urbanization is measured by the percentage of 
residents who live in densely inhabited districts (DIDs) as defined by the 2010 Japanese census.45 
The number of terms served is also used as a control, as the number of times a politician has served 
could also influence their choices in memberships. Particularly junior legislators might be 
interested in appealing to core voters through Shinseiren since they do not currently have a stable 
support base. Finally, a variable that indicates whether the candidate was officially recommended 
by the Komeito Party is included as a control, based on the above discussion regarding the coalition 
between the LDP and Komeito.  A logistic regression is used due to the binary nature of the 
dependent variable. 
 
45 These data were provided by Steven Reed (Chuo University). 
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4.5 Results 
As indicated in the results from Table 4.3, this chapter finds support at the 0.05 level for 
the argument that joining Shinseiren is motivated by strategic reasons.46  
Table 4.3: Effect of Vote Margin on Shinto Seiji Renmei Membership 
Change of Membership to Shinto  
Seiji Renmei 
Vote Margin -.029* (.013) 
Age .423*** (.096) 
Urbanization .743 (.775) 





Constant -18.089*** (4.556) 
N 194 
𝑿𝑿𝟐𝟐 42.81*** 
Standard Errors in Parentheses *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
To understand how vote margins affect an LDP Lower House politician’s likelihood of 
becoming a member of Shinseiren in a more substantive way, it is useful to discuss this relationship 
in terms of the predicted probabilities. Figure 4.1 plots the predicted probabilities against the vote 
margin while holding age, urbanization, and number of terms at their means and Komeito 





46 Replication data is available at my website: https://hopedewellgentry.wixsite.com/welcome/research 
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Figure 4.1: Predicted Probabilities of Joining Shinseiren 
 
 
With a vote margin of about 69%, there is only a 26% chance that the LDP politician will 
become a member of Shinseiren. This finding supports the idea that if the LDP legislator is already 
electorally secure, they do not have a strong incentive to join Shinseiren. However, as the vote 
margin decreases to 36%, the likelihood of joining Shinseiren already increases to almost 47%. As 
the margin gets closer to zero, indicating the politician barely won their election, the probability 
that the politician joins Shinseiren climbs to around 71%. 
Additionally, as for the control variables, the number of terms a politician has been in office 
also has a significant effect on whether or not an LDP member in the Lower House joins 
Shinseiren. Based on the negative coefficient, an LDP politician is more likely to join in an earlier 
stage of their careers. Rookie legislators concerned about the prospects of reelection would 
especially have incentives to join Shinseiren since they do not have a stable base of voters to rely 
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politician joins Shinseiren. As expected, those who represent older districts have a higher 
likelihood of becoming members of Shinseiren. Since older voters are traditionally main 
supporters of the LDP, it is logical that those elected in these areas, where the most traditionalist 
voters are, would possibly be incentivized to appeal to these voters through Shinseiren 
memberships. On the other hand, the results for urbanization and being recommended by Komeito 
were inconclusive.  
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter finds support for the idea that when an LDP politician identifies with Jinja 
Honcho’s political organization Shinto Seiji Renmei, it is done with electoral incentives in mind, 
particularly with the purpose of securing more votes for future elections. Because the number of 
Shinseiren memberships experienced the increase after the 2012 general election, it is less likely 
that these memberships were due to ideological reasons or from a sudden growth of religiosity. 
Instead, because the LDP candidates had no need to make sure it secured over 50% of the vote due 
to the lack of a unified opposition after the 2012 election, the individual members of the LDP were 
then incentivized to appeal to the LDP’s core supporters, as opposed to the swing voters. This is 
particularly the case for those politicians who only won by a small margin, are junior LDP 
members, and represent rural areas.  
While this chapter is not arguing that joining Shinseiren is only motivated by an LDP 
legislator’s desire to appeal to voters, the analysis does demonstrate variation in Shinseiren 
memberships, indicating at least in this case, that it is the voters the SMD candidates have in mind 
when they join Shinseiren. For example, when the LDP legislator had already won by a large vote 
margin and was thus electorally secure, they were less likely to join Shinseiren. If membership in 
Shinseiren was motivated by a desire to appeal to Abe, for example, we would not expect to 
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witness this variation. While outside the scope of this paper, in future research, it could be possible 
to explore the behavior of PR only legislators and their position on the list in order to determine if 
joining religious nationalist organizations are also done as a signal to Abe. 
Further, with the LDP’s lack of external competition with the dissolution of the Democratic 
Party of Japan, there may be changes to the future of Japan’s political landscape. With less 
incentive to take a more centrist position and greater risk for not appealing to core voters, it is 
possible that the longstanding coalition between Komeito and the LDP may be in jeopardy. As 
discussed above, these nationalist circle organizations have a history of proactively lobbying on 
behalf of their political interests, and they actively appeal to representatives in the LDP. What is 
more, the findings of this chapter indicate that this is a two-way street. It is not only that religious 
groups (and groups with religious character) try to gain favor with political officials in order to 
promote their interests, but also politicians who appeal to these religious and religiously affiliated 
groups to promote their electoral interests.  
With the surge of nationalism and nationalistic policies around the world, many scholars 
have been trying to understand the circumstances under which this seemingly sudden growth has 
occurred. With the Ministers of Abe’s Cabinet having such a high rate of membership in Nippon 
Kaigi and Jinja Honcho’s Shinto Seiji Renmei, it is clear that the degree to which these nationalist 
circles and religious nationalism affect Japanese politics needs to be explored. As Japan is a 
democracy with institutionalized separations of religion and the state, it is easy to assume that even 
though groups with nationalist ideologies exist, the secular democratic institutions would not allow 
for religious nationalism to take hold in politics, as these institutions can help address the divisions 
in a society and mediate any potential conflicts (Fox 2007; Lijphart 2004). Yet, with this rise in 
nationalist sentiment around the globe, and its growing influence, it is apparent that secular 
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democracies can also be affected by nationalism in diverse ways. By examining the motivations 
behind individual LDP legislators’ joining Shinseiren, we are able to see an example of how 
political officials strategically appeal to religious nationalism in order to promote their own 
electoral interests.  Rather than only focusing on nationalist sentiment and ideology in general, this 
chapter demonstrates the importance of looking at political and electoral factors in considering 
how religion affects politics, even in a democratic state with institutional structures that mandate 




CONCLUSION: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand and synthesize the divide within the 
literature regarding the idea that Shinto is fundamentally nationalist in nature. Due to Shinto’s 
historical ties to Japanese nationalism, it is clear that religion and nationalism played a role in 
Japanese politics in the past. However, with Japan’s transition to democracy and the constitutional 
provision of the separation between religion and state, religion’s effect on nationalism in Japan 
has become blurred contemporarily. Further, as each of the previous chapters point out, the role 
that Shinto specifically played in Japan’s militarism and nationalism is increasingly called into 
question. To assert that Shinto is simply a nationalist religion understates the role of the Japanese 
government in constructing an image of Japanese character, using Shinto ideals as a tool, but 
ultimately based on strategies to further its own goals, such as modernization and secularization 
(Thomas 2019). Additionally, Shinto is not the only religion in Japan whose followers were 
interested in Japanese imperialism and expansion. Buddhists were also known to encourage this 
image (Hardacre 2017). 
Conversely, contemporary examples of Shinto nationalism are ever present. Nationalist 
circles, or the connection of groups and organizations with nationalist ideologies, often find 
common ground in Shinto ideals. The existence of these groups, like Nippon Kaigi, Jinja Honcho, 
and Shinto Seiji Renmei, maintains these connections between Shinto and nationalism. Even 
Nippon Kaigi, which is not inherently tied to Shinto, draws on ideals of Shinto nationalism, such 
as devotion to the emperor.  
This dissertation explores how both sides of the literature can be simultaneously true. 
Chapter 2 empirically tests the claim that Shinto is inherently nationalist. Based on public opinion 
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from the Japanese Value Orientations survey, which has been conducted since 1973, I find that 
being a Shinto practitioner is not, in fact, a valuable predictor for holding nationalist sentiment or 
for supporting the Liberal Democratic Party. Instead, the relationship between nationalism and 
support for the LDP is more direct. However, it is also important to note that Shinto practitioners 
are not necessarily anti-nationalist, either. If most Shinto practitioners were interested in separating 
themselves from the assertion that Shinto is nationalist, we might expect to find that they would 
be significantly less likely to hold nationalist ideals or support the LDP. Yet, there were only three 
years (1993, 1998, 2008) where Shinto practitioners were found to be less likely to have nationalist 
sentiment and one year (2003) where they were less likely to support the LDP. 
The third chapter builds on these finding. Rather than assuming Shinto practitioners are 
nationalist or non-nationalist, I divide Shinto practitioners into the two categories. By doing so, 
we can gain insight into how and why Shinto practitioners participate in politics, not only 
compared to one another, but also to non-Shintoists. Again using the Japanese Value Orientations 
survey, the third chapter finds Shinto practitioners participate in more forms of politics than non-
Shintoists. Considering the two groups of Shinto practitioners might be competing with one 
another for political space, this finding is reasonable. Additionally, Shinto nationalists were more 
likely than Shinto non-nationalists to be members of political groups or organizations. While both 
groupings of Shinto practitioners have motivation to participate in a variety of political forms, it 
may be the case that Shinto nationalists put themselves in positions that make their goals and ideals 
more accessible to political groups. Further, nationalist political and religious groups may be more 
willing to appeal to this group of Shinto nationalists, knowing they are politically active and could 
therefore serve as a reliable core. 
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In the fourth chapter, I expand upon this idea of a core of Shinto nationalist voters. Due to 
the circumstances surrounding the 2012 Japanese general election, the LDP gained a large number 
of freshman legislators, many of whom were not members of Jinja Honcho’s political organization, 
Shinto Seiji Renmei. However, the number of Shinseiren members among the LDP Lower House 
grew from 51% in 2013 to around 75% in 2014. The rapid increase in Shinseiren memberships, 
particularly among the freshmen legislators, suggests that more than religious ideology might be 
motivating the membership increase. I find that there is a politically strategic reason: when a 
legislator’s vote margin is small and is therefore electorally insecure, they were more likely to join 
Shinto Seiji Renmei. By doing so, these legislators could be signaling to that core of reliable Shinto 
nationalists found in chapter three that they are part of the nationalist circle. 
Even though the evidence is mounting against the accuracy around the idea of State Shinto 
and the fundamentally nationalist nature of Shinto, the narrative persists. The existence of 
nationalist circles perpetuates these narratives, regardless of the truthfulness of the association 
between Shinto and nationalism because this narrative serves as a benefit to some groups. Shinto 
may not be automatically nationalist, but there are still nationalistic Shinto practitioners. The 
description of Shinto as inherently nationalist is not likely to go away while that description still 
serves a purpose. 
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTION 42 FROM JAPANESE VALUE ORIENTATIONS SURVEY 
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Indicate party support (支持政党 ) 
Liberal Democratic Party 自民党 
Democratic Party of Japan 民主党 
Komeito 公明党 
Communist Party 共産党 
Social Democratic Party 社民（社会）党 
People’s New Party 国民新党 
New Party Nippon 新党日本 
Other その他の政治団体 
No support for a particular party 特に支持している政党はない 




LIKELIHOOD OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION WITH ALL YEARS
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 Demonstrate Sign Petitions Write Media Donate Political Meetings 
Political 
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2013 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 











N 32,907 32,907 32,907 32,907 32,907 32,907 
X2  507.10*** 711.12*** 44.99*** 433.10*** 1282.26*** 333.29*** 
Standard Errors in Parentheses *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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